^{1}J. Von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern,
*Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1944.

^{2}J.F. Nash,'The Bargaining Problem,"
Econometrica 18 (1950), 155-162.

^{3}R. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and
Decisions*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, 1957. No comparable
survey exists for work done since 1957.

^{4}T. Schelling, *The Strategy of
Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960.

^{5}I briefly discuss the idea that
bargaining outcomes depend on such subjective perceptions of the
situation.in D. Friedman, "Many, Few, One: Social Harmony and the
Shrunken Choice Set," *AER* 70 (1980), 225-232.

^{6}The obvious approach of replacing a
single play with an n-fold iteration of the game has not been
particularly successful, since the iterated game generally has the
same sort of indeterminacy of outcome as the single game. My
approach, while superficially similar, is in fact entirely different.