Joe Bond
Legal Research Ð Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Legal Issues of the 21st Century
Prof. David Friedman
Introduction
In
my mind, there are two forms of Artificial Intelligences. The first is the
computer AI we all are familiar with, which I call the Machine AI. The second
is the ÒupliftedÓ animal,[1]
which achieves full sentience and human level intelligence and communication
skills. I have never heard of anyone else making this classification, so for
now I will assume that it is my creation.[2]
Obviously, since Òscience fictionÓ
AI has never actually been invented (to my knowledge, anyway), there is no way
that the courts can address the issue of the legal status of an AI. However,
several less scifi-ish scenarios have been at least discussed in the legal
literature..
What is a Person?
This
is a fiendishly difficult topic to research. What I gather is that a person is
a modern humanÑhomo sapiens sapiens. The term ÒpersonÓ does not include smart
animals or unborn children incapable of surviving outside of their motherÕs
womb. Intelligence doesnÕt have anything to do with personhood as of today.[3]
My guess is that the law will, at least initially have laws somewhat like the
fictional law proposed by Steven
Spielberg in his movie AI: Artificial
Intelligence, (2001):
"All sentient artificial constructs, including robots and robotic
devices, inanimate devices and structures containing artificial intelligence,
and all other sentient inanimate repositories, are deemed to be personal
property and shall be governed by common laws and statutory laws addressing
personal property. Said property shall have no special rights outside the
rights of the given personal property owner."[4]
What is the status of intellectual property developed by
a software program?
One current question where we may
soon see an answer which might apply to AIs in the future is the question of
whether the creator of a software program may claim copyright or patent rights
over product of that programÕs creativity. Current legal scholarship seems to
lean in the direction of a negative answer to that question.[5]
It seems clear that the patent statute requires that the person applying for a
patent must have actually been the inventor[6],
so if the owner of the program got the idea from outside of his own brain, the
argument goes, then he canÕt be the inventor. The same goes for copyright.[7]
This concept seems quite clear, although the courts donÕt always see things my
way, so I make no predictions here. The question in the future will be whether
a sentient AI who invents something will have the right to obtain a patent or
copyright. I believe the answer will turn on whether the constitution covers
AIs (are AIs people?) or whether an AI can be an author or inventor.
What are the ramifications of expert system legal advice?
There are quite a few legal software products in the
marketplace right now which can provide help with taxes, wills & trusts,
divorces, etc. Basically, these programs can do simple tasks, but there is the
possibility of analyzing complex legal issues using more complex programs.
There is quite a bit of speculation in the field of what needs to be done, and
Anne Gardner, a pioneer in the field of case based AI has summarized what she
believes is necessary for workable legal AI:
1. the ability to reason with cases and examples,
particularly through analogy;
2. the ability to handle ill-defined, open-textured
predicates;
3. the ability to handle exceptions;
4. the ability to handle fundamental conflicts between
rules; and
5. the ability to handle change and nonmonotonicity.[8]
A method proposed by Gardner (the GP program) is summarized
below in pseudocode:
If (there is a tentative answer)
then
if (there are no "opposite" cases)
then (the case is easy);
but if (there are opposite cases)
then
if (there are also similarly aligned cases)
then (the law is unsettled and the question is hard);
otherwise (let the technical legal rule override the
conflicting CSK [Common Sense Knowledge] rule; the answer is easy).
If (there is no tentative answer)
then
if(no cases match)
or if (two or more cases match but conflict)
then (the cases fail to resolve the issue and the
question is hard);
otherwise (the question is easy and the answer is that indicated by the case(s) that
match.[9]
Other examples of case based
reasoning can be found at www.cs.umass.edu/~cbr.
As of this date, there has been no breakthrough in the legal AI field. Thus,
there is no case law on point and it is pure speculation to make any
predictions as to where the field will go in the future. I believe that agency
law will play a part in how AI legal advice is viewedÑi.e. the programmer is
responsible for the legal advice that the program gives. This of course assumes
that the state bars will allow a program to practice without a license.
Who is responsible for the actions of an autonomous
software agent?
There is a project called ALIAS,
based out of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam which aims to study the legal and
technical issues that arise from the use of software agents. The project
assumes that society will be more likely to accept agent technology if there is
a clearly defined legal context.[10]
Unfortunately, I could find no cases of anyone litigating over the actions of
an autonomous software agent, much less an AI, so once again I have to rely on
speculation as to how the courts will rule.
As I see it, there are several ways
to look at an AI agent under the current lawÑthe AI is an employee and the user
is the employer (respondeat superior), it is a product and the manufacturer is
responsible for damages if harm is caused by a defective AI, or the AI is equivalent to a minor or
incompetent adult and is incapable of forming a binding agreement. I suppose
that the level of intelligence and independence of the particular program will
determine the law on a case by case basis, unless some law is passed that
requires action one way or another[11].
If the program is self-modifying and acting in an unauthorized manner, it will
be difficult to show a chain of causation for damages back to the programmer or
owner. If the program is acting under specific orders and follows them to the
letter, you would think that the courts will enforce agreements against the
employer/owner.
LEGAL RESEARCH FOR
VIRTUAL REALITY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
By Steven Roeser
I
tried to approach these subjects under different factual scenarios than
previous students so as not to be repetitive in respect to their research.
As
previous studentsÕ research explores in detail, the actual technology and
programs for virtual reality experiences, as well as the creation process for
artificial intelligence, could be protected under intellectual property law:
the Copyright Act of 1976, right of publicity, unfair competition, patents.
Refer to the course page online.
In
the not too distant future, it may be possible for a human being to have a
digital clone of oneself(or of a human in general). This clone could conceivably walk, talk, hear, speak, and learn
as it spends more time interacting with others. The digital clone could look exactly like itÕs living human
model so that a living human could not readily tell the difference between the
living human and his digital clone.
This raises a number of interesting legal issues. What legal rights would this digital
clone and/or the creator of this digital clone have if any? Would this digital clone be the
property of the creator/consumer, or would it be free to roam and do as it
pleases?
The
rights of a digital clone would depend on the classification of the clone. This issue turns on what is considered
a ÒpersonÓ under current laws.
Most sections of the US Constitution contain the word ÒpersonÓ or
Òpeople.Ó There is no definition of a ÒpersonÓ in our legal system and no
criteria for determining what constitutes a person. BlackÕs Law Dictionary
defines a ÒpersonÓ as Òa human being; the living body of a human being.Ó It defines an Òartificial personÓ as
Òan entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given certain legal
rights and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the
purpose of legal reasoning is treated more or less as a human being.Ó A digital clone could arguably fall into
the category of an artificial person, but even this classification does not
guarantee all of the rights guaranteed to a person, but rather ÒcertainÓ ones.
For
example, the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution states ÒAll persons born or naturalized in the US and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the US and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the US; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.Ó Therefore in order to be a US citizen,
a being must be classified as a
ÒpersonÓ.
Because
the digital clone would be created electronically rather than biologically,
under our current legal regime it seems that the clone would not be considered
a ÒpersonÓ. Because of the
electronic nature of the digital clone, and the fact that it would be created
by living persons, it would seem to fall more appropriately in a category of
some type of property. If this
were the case, the digital clone would not have the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to the people of the United States, such as due process and equal protection.
Could a digital clone be forced to work for the benefit of
its creator or owner?
The 13th Amendment states Òneither slavery nor
involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the US, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.Ó
This
Amendment makes no mention of a ÒpersonÓ; however, I do not think this would
strengthen the digital cloneÕs argument against being forced to work. US citizens routinely use animals for
labor, sometimes against their will, and while a digital clone would be more
intelligent than animals as its mental capacity would be tantamount to a living
humanÕs, the digital clone is built from computer technology, and really could
be considered a most advanced computer system ever created. Again, this goes to
the issue of what constitutes a ÒpersonÓ.
Could an artificial intelligence being have standing to sue?
Could a human bring suit against a digital clone?
If
a clone of a famous actor was created for someone other than the famous human
actor himself, and this clone was then used in movies, the living actor would
have legal remedies.
Right
of publicity- If a digital clone of a famous person was used in unauthorized
ads without the consent of the human famous person, this would violate the
humanÕs right to publicity and damages would be recoverable. unfair business practices
A
clone with a unique physical appearance(one that is not modeled after a
specific living human) could make defamatory statements about a living
human. Could the defamed party
then commence an action against the clone in a court of law? In the case of a digital clone
identical to a living human, because the digital clone could be mistaken for
its living human model, there would be great potential for the clone to commit
acts that the public would believe to be committed by the human rather than the
clone, or vice versa. For example,
if the digital clone appeared on television and defamed another person, many
might believe the human was the one who committed the defamatory act rather
than the digital clone of the human.
This would lead to a scenario whereby the victim of the defamatory
statements would want to pursue a cause of action against the human being while
the human being may want to commence an action against the clone.
Erwin
Chemerinsky, a constitutional law scholar, defines ÒstandingÓ as Òthe
determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a
matter to the court for adjudication.Ó This includes Òartificial personsÓ as
well as corporations and other such entities are often involved in litigation. Again this question turns on the
definition of a ÒpersonÓ and whether a digital clone would be classified as
such. The scenarios set forth
above again seem to suggest that a system of human accountability for digital
clones would be likely due to the uncertainty of their behavior and the impact
they could have on society if digital clones had the same rights as human
persons.
AI/VR AND CRIME
If a human committed a premeditated attack on a digital
clone and successfully destroyed the clone, would the attacker be guilty of
murder?
Again,
because the clone most likely would not be classified as a person, the
perpetrator of the crime would not be charged with murder. First degree murder requires a
sufficient combination proving planning the murder, a motive to kill, and a
sufficient manner of carrying the crime out. While these elements would all be
present, because the human attacker intends to destroy a digital clone rather
than a human, under our current legal regime the perpetrator would most likely
be guilty of a crime against property, such as felony vandalism.
What if the human attacker thought that the digital clone
was a specific living human being and intended to kill the human being?
These
facts change the scenario drastically as the perpetrator now believes the clone
is a human and has the specific intent to kill the human, although the victim
ends up being a clone. Attempted
murder requires: the specific intent to kill an individual, as well as a
sufficient act toward the commission of the offense, clearly present here as
the perpetrator believed he was killing the human. The perpetrator would be guilty of attempted murder.
If a virtual reality experience went bad due to an
unintentional technical error, such as the person experiencing a severe beating
in the virtual reality world, what remedies would be available to the victim?
The
victim could sue the inventor, manufacturer and owner of the virtual reality
equipment for general negligence, requiring a showing of a general duty of
care, breach of that duty of care, proximate causation, and an injury. The victim could also sue for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, which requires showing: 1) that the plaintiff
was within a zone of danger of physical impact(or reasonably feared for safety
regardless of zone of danger in a minority of jurisdictions); 2) the plaintiff
must reasonably fear for their own safety; 3) plaintiff must show that they
suffered severe emotional distress with attendant physical manifestations. It
could be tough to show that P was actually in the zone of danger (in a majority
rule jurisdiction) but plaintiff might be able to do so by showing they were
jolting violently in response the virtual reality experience.
The
victim could also bring a product liability action against the virtual reality
unit designer and manufacturer. A design defect product liability action
requires a showing that the design was defective, was the actual and proximate
cause of plaintiffÕs injury, and there was a safer alternate design.
CONCLUSION
Out current legal system seems well equipped to deal with most problems virtual reality technology poses. However, if and when the time comes where we can create digital clones of ourselves or of humans in general, some new laws will have to be enacted to manage the impact the digital clones would have on our society. A structure of responsibility and accountability for the actions of the digital clones would have to be established, such as putting the weight of responsibility on the shoulders of the creator/owner of the clone. The legal status of a digital clone or artificial intelligence being would have to be changed to a ÒpersonÓ for them to enjoy the same protections as humans, and I do not believe that our society would grant these artificial intelligence beings human status due to the threat they could pose to our societyÕs structure and the general impact this would have on our society. Living humans would most likely be held responsible for the actions of digital clones that they create or own.
Alan Mason
Legal Issues in the 21st Century
Deep VR Legal Research
Copyright
Liability
The first most obvious protection for Deep VR would be
under the Copyright Act of 1976:
17 USCS ¤ 106 (2001)
¤ 106.
Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of a
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any
of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.
Any type of VR program, like a computer game or
audiovisual work, could be copyrighted in Deep VR. Any infringement would fall under:
17 USCS ¤ 501 (2001)
¤ 501.
Infringement of copyright
(a)
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 through 121, or of the author as provided in section
106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in
violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the
author, as the case may be. For purposes of this chapter [17 USCS ¤¤ 501 et
seq.] (other than section 506), any reference to copyright shall be deemed to
include the rights conferred by section 106A(a). As used in this subsection,
the term "anyone" includes any State, any instrumentality of a State,
and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in
his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer,
or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the same
manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
(b) The
legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled,
subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of
it. The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action with
a copy of the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright
Office or otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall
require that such notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to
be affected by a decision in the case. The court may require the joinder, and
shall permit the intervention, of any person having or claiming an interest in
the copyright.
(c) For
any secondary transmission by a cable system that embodies a performance or a
display of a work which is actionable as an act of infringement under
subsection (c) of section 111, a television broadcast station holding a
copyright or other license to transmit or perform the same version of that work
shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be treated as a legal or
beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs within the local service
area of that television station.
(d) For
any secondary transmission by a cable system that is actionable as an act of
infringement pursuant to section 111(c)(3), the following shall also have
standing to sue: (i) the primary transmitter whose transmission has been
altered by the cable system; and (ii) any broadcast station within whose local
service area the secondary transmission occurs.
(e) With
respect to any secondary transmission that is made by a satellite carrier of a
performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission and is
actionable as an act of infringement under section 119(a)(5), a network station
holding a copyright or other license to transmit or perform the same version of
that work shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be treated as
a legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs within the
local service area of that station.
(f) (1)
With respect to any secondary transmission that is made by a satellite carrier
of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission and is
actionable as an act of infringement under section 122, a television broadcast
station holding a copyright or other license to transmit or perform the same
version of that work shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be
treated as a legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs
within the local market of that station.
(2) A television broadcast station
may file a civil action against any satellite carrier that has refused to carry
television broadcast signals, as required under section 122(a)(2), to enforce
that television broadcast station's rights under section 338(a) of the
Communications Act of 1934
[47 USCS
¤ 338(a)].
As to the content of the program, there would be some
dispute as to what could be copied.
The best analogy would probably be with motion pictures. A movie can depict an enormous spectrum
of content. For example, there are
hundreds of movies depicting World War Two. Under the current law, no one would be able to copyright
World War Two as their own.
Applying this to Deep VR, no one would be able to copyright a specific
environment but the original story surrounding the war could be. In movies, these are called Òscenes a
faire.Ó Zambito v. Paramount
Pictures Corp. 788 F.2d 2.
These are basic circumstances that are necessary for the type of movie
that one is making. The law would
probably follow this type of structure for Deep VR.
Virtual Reality may also bring liability for infringement
like the Napster case today. A&M Records v. Napster, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1941 (9th Cir. Cal. 2001).
If there is Virtual Reality at home, there could be a system where one
could download different programs like music is downloaded on Napster. This leads to the same liability that
Napster is facing today along with those who are caught infringing.
Court Rules or Civil Procedure
Virtual Reality may come up as evidence in the courts, 13
J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 145, VIRTUAL REALITY: THE REALITY OF
GETTING IT ADMITTED by Mary C. Kelly & Jack N. Bernstein. This law review talks about the
use of VR in the courtroom as evidence.
Under the Federal Rules of evidence, 401, evidence is generally
considered relevant when it persuades the finder of fact that a fact in
controversy does or does not exist.
A VR demonstration must indicate that material facts at issue in the
case do or do not exist. Since the proponent of the VR demonstration will use
testimonial and real evidence from a case to create the demonstration, it will
be considered relevant.
Under the existing laws, a doctor and a patient have an
confidentiality privilege. Deep VR
will most likely be used as a form of treatment in the future. This information couldnÕt be used as
evidence under the doctor-patient privilege. Liability could result to any doctor who violates that
confidentiality.
Tort Law
Virtual Reality presents a tort issue of liability should
one get hurt using the VR. General
tort law would be essential the same for injuries in VR as they presently
are. There would need to be the
same elements, of a duty, a breach of the duty, causation, and damages. The makers of the VR program could be
held liable under general tort law if these elements were met.
The program makers could also meet some liability for
defective products. The general law is that the defect in the product causing
the injury was basically an unknown consequence of normal use but foreseeable. If the program should hurt someone
because of a defect, and the person was using the product in a reasonable
manner, then liability could follow if reasonably foreseeable.
The program makers could also meet some other liability for
defamation and unfair competition law.
The VR could defame someone and if the elements: 1. defamatory
statement; 2. special harm; 3. published to a 3rd party; and 4. fault amounting to negligence, are met,
the program makers could be liable.
There are defenses to this such as a public figure or
newsworthiness.
The VR program makers could be liable under unfair
competition if they use a celebrity or likeness in the program. In White v. Samsung Electronics
America Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, a television commercial used a futuristic
robot that turned a game show letter.
Vanna White won the case for the right of publicity. The VR program makers could be liable
under this type of case should they use some celebrity or likeness in the
program that is sold in commerce.
Virtual Reality could give cause to a medical malpractice
action assuming the elements of a tort are met. DoctorÕs may likely use VR to perform procedures as practice
or a test on a specific personÕs problem.
If the VR simulation works but the actual procedure fails, it is likely
that the doctor could be liable if he or she relied too heavily on the VR
program as a test procedure.
Virtual Reality could also be used as for an anesthetic to a
patient. If the doctor uses the
program improperly, the patient wakes up or a variety of other situations, the
procedure would cause the patient harm and under tort law, the doctor could be
held responsible if the elements of a tort are met.
Criminal Law
Virtual Reality presents a new way to murder someone. If VR is used to kill someone, it would
expose one to murder charges of 1st Degree or 2nd
Degree. If the killing is
negligent, manslaughter could follow or 2nd Degree gross reckless
murder.
Virtual Reality could also be used to commit crimes such as
burglary. For example, a bank
robber could make everyone in the bank see a virtual reality program and rob
the bank. There are a variety of
statutes that cover all different types of crimes and it would have to be
specifically tailored to the situation.
The point is, however, that new ways of committing crimes would still
fall under a number of different criminal laws already in existence.
Conclusion
Although there are an unlimited number of issues that Deep
VR could present, I believe that existing laws would be able to meet such
technology. There would obviously
be new ways of doing things, such as presenting evidence in the courtroom, but
the existing law could handle this technology.
Here are some interesting articles to look up:
PR Newswire, June 15, 1998, Immersive Systems Inc.
Produces Virtual Worlds for Psychological Therapy.
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution May 9, 1996,
Thursday, DREAM ON; Maybe virtual
reality could help solve some of the Earth's very real problems
Ellen Wang
Legal Issues of the 21st Century
April 22, 2001
Legal Issues and Analysis for Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property
I. Should a
machine have patent rights?
- 35
U.S.C. s 102 states Ò [a] person shall
be entitled to a patent unlessÉÓ
- 35
U.S.C. s 101 states Ò[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new or useful process, machine, maunfacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.Ó
It seems that it is unlikely that
a computer or machine can have patent rights unless the definition of a
ÒpersonÓ is changed.
II.
If you program an AI computer with all the requisite
knowledge about, for instance, human anatomy, medicine, chemistry, etc., and it
develops a cure, can you own the patent?
- 35
U.S.C. s 102 states Ò [a] person shall
be entitled to a patent unlessÉÓ
subsection (f) Òhe himself did not
himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented,ÉÓ
- The
inventor is the person who conceived of the specific invention claimed. A person (for example, an employer) who
merely directs another (an employee) to solve a problem or make an invention is
not an inventor, unless he also told the other how to do it. The provision of subsection (f) does
not prevent an inventor from assigning rights in an invention, or to a patent
in the invention, to another.
However, when such an assignment is made prior to the granting of a
patent, the assignee must pursue the application in the inventorÕs name.
- from Margreth Barrett,
Intellectual Property, p. 36 (1999-2000).
This problem is somewhat
complicated since it is unlikely that a computer with AI is seen as a ÒpersonÓ
but on the other hand, the person who created the computer and the programs
that allowed the computer to invent something, did not himself conceive of the
invention. Even if the computer
was seen as an ÒemployeeÓ of the person who created the computer program, the
person cannot be considered the inventor.
But under 35 U.S.C. s 101,
Ò[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
or useful process...Ó might be construed such that a person using an AI
computer as a tool still actually ÒdiscoversÓ something patentable.
III.
If you use an AI computer for the purposes of inventing
something, what other patent laws might come into play?
A. Non-obvious standard
35 U.S.C. s 103
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter:
A patent may not
be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as
set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter as a whole sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. Patentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
The Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) held that to make this
determination, three factors must be considered: 1) the scope and content of
the pertinent prior art; 2) differences between the pertinent prior art; and 3)
the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.
The use of a
computer with AI will undoubtedly affect the standard of a Òperson having
ordinary skill in the art.Ó If
everyone in a particular field began using AI computers to invent things, the
standard for what is obvious probably should be raised.
IV.
Should a computer with AI have copyrights in works that
it produces? For exampleÕs
KurzweilÕs Cybernetic Poet could write poetry that was essentially
indistinguishable from poetry that actual human poets wrote.
Copyrights protect the expression
of ideas rather than the ideas or methods in themselves. Copyright is the traditional form of
intellectual property that protects non-utilitarian works such as literature,
art, music, and entertainment production in all their genres.
- from Howard Anawalt, Elizabeth
Powers, IP Strategy, p. 1-77 (2000)
-17 U.S.C. s 102(a) provides that a
copyright subsists Òin original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.Ó
-It seems that the poems meet both
the originality and fixed medium requirement.
-The term of a copyright is
lifetime plus 70 years for works created after January 1, 1978. If an AI computer were to be granted
copyrights, then this term is problematic because the term could go
indefinitely.
- Section 201 Ownership of
Copyright states:
(a) Initial
Ownership. Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the authors or authors of the work.
The authors of a joint work are co-owners of a copyright in the work.
(b) Works made
for hire. In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title,
and, unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
É
- I could not find any language stating that an author is
a person. It seems then that a
computer, with AI , could possibly have copyright interests under the current
copyright laws.