Gypsy Law
The
total number of gypsies (aka Rom, Romani) is variously estimated as from three
to fifteen million[1].
If current scholarship is correct, they are descendants of a population that
left northern India more than a thousand years ago. They first appear in
European history in the 15th century, showing up at the court of the
Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund, where they claimed to be from lesser Egypt in
Greece, on pilgrimage as penance for the temporary abandonment of Christianity
by their ancestors.[2] Multiple
accounts describe them as travelling through Europe bearing letters of safe
conduct from Sigismund, letters giving them judicial autonomy, the right to be
punished only by their own authorities.
The
letters may have been forgeries created by their bearers to protect them from
local law enforcement authorities, but they need not have been. Polylegal
systems in which different people in the same country were under different laws
and legal authorities were common in medieval and renaissance Europe as we will
see in later chapters. It is possible that 15th century Gypsies
persuaded Sigismund that they were entitled to similar treatment.
Whether
or not 15th c. Gypsies obtained a grant of de jure judicial autonomy from a 15th c. emperor, gypsy
communities through the centuries have been strikingly successful in
maintaining their de facto autonomy,
remaining below the radar of the official legal system while imposing their own
rules on their own members. It is that fact that makes them of interest for the
purposes of this book. Presently existing Gypsy communities provide examples of
not one legal system very different from ours but several different systems, legal
systems differing primarily not in the rules they enforce but in the mechanisms
they use to enforce them.
The
rules, in large part common to the different communities, can be usefully
grouped into two categories. One consists of ordinary legal rules covering the
obligations of gypsies to each other. Swindling or stealing from a fellow gypsy
is an offense to be dealt with, swindling or stealing from a non-gypsy comes
under gypsy law only to the extent that it creates problems for other
gysies.
The
second category covered by gypsy law is an elaborate system of purity and
pollution, rather like orthodox Judaism on steroids. Its central tenet is that
the human body is unclean from the waist down, clean from the waist up. Contact
with the unclean is polluting—ŅmarimˇÓ—and the pollution is
contagious. Someone who is polluted will find others reluctant to associate
with him or even permit him to touch their possessions, providing an automatic
enforcement mechanism for the rules against pollution and an incentive to go
through the rituals required to cleanse pollution.
Excretion
and reproduction, being associated with the lower half of the body, are the
subject of extensive rules and restrictions. Among the Vlach Rom, the largest
of the Romani cultures, a pregnant woman is expected to eat alone, consume food
cooked in her own pots, and after childbirth destroy the garments she wore
while pregnant. A woman can pollute a man by skirt tossing—exposing her
genitals—obliging the victim engage in costly procedures of purification.
The Kaale, the Finnish gypsies, a small population isolated for centuries,
carry this attitude even further, refusing to openly admit the facts of human
reproduction.[3]
They have no institution of marriage; couples that wish to reproduce are
expected to first leave their family households, flee a substantial distance
away—far enough so that their kin cannot find them and retrieve the
woman—and return only when the child is weaned and so no longer requires
a visible association with its mother. On returning, the father is expected to
show the humility appropriate to one who has violated the norms of his society
while the women of the motherÕs generation smuggle mother and child back into
the household, where the child will be expected to treat all the women of his
motherÕs generation as equally mothers.
One
result of the Kaale rejection of sexuality is to eliminate many of the taboos associated
with it among other Gypsy groups. There can be no restrictions associated with
menstruation since enforcing them would require recognition of the fact of
menstruation, and similarly with pregnancy. A Kaale woman living in the
household of her (or her partnerÕs) kin conceals the fact of pregnancy until
shortly before delivery, and arranges for it to happen somewhere outside of the
household—in modern times in a maternity hospital.
The
marimˇ rules, while differing in detail across Gypsy communities, are similar
in their general form. What differs much more is the system for enforcing both
those rules and other parts of gypsy law. Among the Vlach Rom, the descendants
of the gypsies enserfed for four centuries in Romania, disputes that cannot be
settled at a lower level are submitted to a kris, a court proceeding in which
all adult male members of the community (in some cases female as well) are
permitted to take part. Details of how the kris functions vary across accounts and
probably across communities, in particular to what degree the ŅjudgesÓ produce
a verdict and to what degree they simply function as chairmen presiding over an
open discussion. Whatever the details, the common pattern is that the dispute
is argued until consensus is reached; that consensus is then imposed on the
parties to the dispute, if necessary enforced by the threat of ostracism via a
sentence of marimˇ.
Ostracism
provides one example of how an embedded legal system like that of the gypsies,
one that exists within a territory under the rule of a state with much greater
resources of coercion than the community possesses, can function. Refusing to
associate with someone is not illegal, so the verdict of the kris can be enforced
without violating state law. Other possible verdicts, up to and including
capital punishment, have in the past been imposed, but become less workable the
greater the ability of the state legal system to enforce its own rules on the
embedded commuity and the greater its interest in doing so. Thus an embedded legal system that
operates without a state sanction is more restricted in its means of
enforcement than one that possesses that sanction, as Jewish communal
authorities in the medieval period frequently did and as 15th c.
gysies at least claimed.
In
contrast to the Vlach Rom, the Romanichal, the largest of the British
gypsy communities, enforce their rules not by communal pressure and the threat
of ostracism but by a feud system, a less developed version of the same legal
system as saga period Iceland.[4]
A Romanichal gypsy who believes his rights to have been violated responds by
demanding, with threats of violence, compensation. Both parties know that if
rights as defined by the norms of that community have been violated, the
violatorÕs friends will be reluctant to support him, the victimÕs friends
willing to support him. That makes it in the guilty violatorÕs interest to
offer compensation or, if unwilling or unable to do so, to remove himself from
the neighborhood of the victim, just as an Icelander outlawed for failing to
pay the fine imposed on him by a court would leave Iceland. As with any well
functioning feud system, while the incentive to obey the laws or norms is
provided by the threat of private violence, actual violence is the exception
rather than the rule.
The
differences between the Vlach Rom and the Romanichal, each of which is inclined
to view its institutions as the original and the otherÕs as a corrupted
version, are not limited to different enforcement mechnisms. The Vlach Rom
organize themselves into extended families, and practice marriage by purchase;
the Romanichal function as independent individuals, and practice marriage by elopement.
The
Kaale provide an example of a third approach to enforcement. The relevant unit
is the household, not, as among the Romanichal, the individual. All households
are considered peers, and there exists no mechanism above the household for
peacefully settling disputes. Conflict within the household is settled
internally, in a society in which authority is centered in male elders.
Violation of marimˇ rules in ways that affect other kin groups leads to a loss
of status and honor by the group whose member is responsible, providing an
incentive to prevent such violations by enforcement within the household.
Conflict
between individuals of different households, if sufficiently serious, leads to
duels between the parties, under rules designed to reduce the risk of death or
serious injury. If death or serious injury does occur, in the context of a duel
or otherwise, the result is a blood feud between the kin groups of the parties.
In principle, the feud can be pursued by any member of the group one of whose
members was killed or injured against any member of the other group, although
in practice women or children are unlikely to be targeted, the responsible
individual in the other group particularly likely to be. Successful retaliation
does not end the feud and there is no equivalent of the court procedures or
arbitrated settlements that terminated Icelandic feuds; successful retaliation
merely exchanges the position of the two kin groups.
While
in theory these rules could lead to a succession of killings, in practice feud
mostly takes the form not of violence but of avoidance—of all members of
each kin group by all members of the other.
Explaining Differences
Gypsy
communities share a common ancestry, a common language, a common set of rules
of cleanliness and pollution, but have several quite different approaches to
enforcing the rules of the community. That raises an obvious and interesting
puzzle. Why do the Vlach Rom have, and the Kaale and Romanichal not have, the
institution of the Kris? Why do the Vlach Rom not have and the Kaale and Romanichal
have, in somewhat different forms, the institution of feuding?
The
authors of Chapter 3 of Gypsy Law,
whose description of the Romanichal system is reflected in my description
above, offer an interesting, if conjectural, solution. They argue that the feud
system depends in part on the ability, when all else fails, of one party to
walk out on the other party and the dispute; absent that, the risk of serious
violence becomes too large. Gypsies have, for most of their history, been a
migratory population, but there is at least one large exception, the period of
four centuries during which the Vlach Rom were enserfed in Romania. Serfdom
meant the loss of mobility. Hence they argue that the feud system represents
the original institution, the Kris and associated institutions an adaptation to
the special circumstances of serfdom, arising among the Vlach Rom and adapted
from institutions of the Romanian peasantry.
I have
no analogous explanation for the difference between feud as practiced by the Romanichal
and feud as practiced by Kaale or, more generally, the individualism of the Romanichal
and the household based society of the Kaale. But Marti Gronforss, on whose
account of the Kaale mine is based, does offer an interesting suggestion
linking Kaale blood feud to Kaale non-mariage.
Mating
among the Kaale is exogamous, pairing within the household strictly forbidden. The
recognition of a serious and stable relationship created by sexual partnership
and reproduction would create kinship links between households, subverting
institutions based on autonomous and coequal households. Under institutions of
non-marriage, one partner resides in the household of the otherÕs kin as a sort
of resident alien. Hence blood feud involving the household of one partner does
not concern the other or his kin as participants or potential targets. If a blood
feud arises between the households of partners the result is the immediate and
complete severing of the connection between them, with the one who was dwelling
in the household of the otherÕs kin returning to his or her own kinÕs household.
Embedded Law: Problems and Solutions
There
are at least three different ways in which a community can enforce its own
legal system despite the superior access to force of the legal system of the
state within whose territory it is located. One is by delegation; the state
legal system subcontracts the job of enforcing legal rules on the members of
the community to the communal authority, and delegates some of its authority
for the purpose. Gypsy communities in the past have claimed and may perhaps
have possessed such delegated authority, but contemporary communities, with
very minor exceptions,[5]
do not.
A
second approach is for the community to restrict the mechanisms by which it
enforces its legal rules to acts that do not conflict with the rules of the
state legal system. An example is the use of the threat of ostracism by the
Vlach Rom to enforce the verdict of a kris.
The
effectiveness of that threat depends on how easily the exiled gypsy can
function outside of his community. The marimˇ rules (and similar rules in other
societies) provide a mechanism for isolating the members of the community.
Gaije, non-gypsies, do not know the marimˇ rules and so do not and cannot obey
them. It follows that they are all polluted, unclean, carriers of a contagious
disease, people whom no Rom in his right mind would willingly choose to
associate with; when and if such association is unavoidable it must be taken
with great care.[6] The
gypsy view of gaije, reinforced by the gaije view of gypsies as uneducated and
illiterate thieves and swindlers, eliminates the exit option and so empowers
the kris to enforce gypsy law by the threat of exclusion from the only
tolerable human society.[7]
A
third approach to enforcing an embedded legal system, also employed by gypsy
communities, is to use control over information to substitute for control over
physical force. I started this chapter by reporting a range of estimates for
the world population of gypsies.
That the estimates range over almost an order of magnitude is not an accident. Gypsies
do not wish to be controled by gaije. It is hard to control people if you
cannot count them, and it is hard to count people when there is no one to one
correspondence between person and name—Gypsies treat a name, more
generally an identity, as fungible, property belonging to the extended family
to be used by any member who finds it useful. By this tactic and others, modern
gypsies make it difficult for the states that claim authority over them to
monitor and control them, and so increase the range of alternatives available
to gypsies and gypsy law.[8]
[1] Gypsy Law, p. 28. This book is the basis of almost all of the information contained in this chapter.
[2] This is presumably the origin of ŅEgyptianÓ and hence ŅGypsyÓ as labels for the Rom.
[3] This account is based on research done by Marti Gronforss, mostly from 1976-8, and reported in Chapter 7 of Gypsy Law.
[4] This account is based on Chapter 3 of Gypsy Law, written by Thomas Acton, Susan Caffrey, and Gary Mundy.
[5] Gypsy Law pp. 228-30 gives examples of North American courts making some attempt to take account of Gypsy law.
[6] Reference from the book to restricting gaije to front room, covering furniture, etc.
[7] One implication of this is that a more tolerant attitude by non-gypsies towards gypsies may destabilize the gypsy system by making exit easier, as may a more tolerant attitude in the other direction.
[8] For a more detailed description of the ways in which Gypsy communities restrict information about them and control over them by the states within which they live, see Gypsy Law pp. 52-3.