Life-Line:
We
usually expect access to increased knowledge to benefit us, but
there may be
exceptions. Are Professor Pinero’s customers better or worse off
being able to
know the date of their death?
For some of the same issues in a real world context, consider
the implications
of genetic testing. Some
people are born
with bad hearts, some good. As long as nobody knows which is
which it is
possible to insure against the risk of having a bad heart. What
happens if a
genetic test is invented that distinguishes people who are
likely to have a
heart attack from people who are not?
Consider some
possible legal
rules that might be proposed to deal with such an invention:
1.
The test is
banned; nobody is allowed to use it.
2.
Testing is
legal. Insurance companies are permitted to make testing a
condition of
insurance and take account of the result in setting rates.
3.
Individuals are
permitted to get tested; the results are confidential. Insurance
companies are
forbidden to make testing a condition of insurance.
4.
Individuals are
permitted to get tested. Insurance companies are not permitted
to require
testing as a condition of insurance but are permitted to know
whether or not a
potential customer has been tested and to take account of that
fact in setting
the rate they charge him.
What are the
consequences of
each rule? Is it possible that, under some or all rules, the
invention of the
test makes us worse off?
To see why the
answer is
“yes,” compare rules 1 and 2. Under rule 1, which corresponds to
the situation
before the test is invented, neither the insurance company nor
the customer
knows the condition of the customer’s heart, so the risk of
having a bad heart
is insurable. Under rule 2, if you try to buy insurance and
refuse to be tested
the company will take that as evidence that you have already
been tested and discovered
that you have a bad heart. The company will set the price of the
insurance accordingly.
You can get tested, show the results to the insurance company
and insure
against whatever uncertainty is left, but the risk of having a
bad heart is now
uninsurable.
The result of
rule 3 is
worse still. Since the price is the same whether you have a good
or bad heart,
insurance against a heart attack is a much better deal for
people who know they
have bad hearts. The insurance company, realizing that, prices
its policies on
the assumption that someone who chooses to insure against a
heart attack is
probably a bad risk. People with good hearts cannot get
insurance unless they
are willing to pay far more than the actuarial value of their
risk, so many of
them don’t buy. That leaves an insurance market mainly populated
by bad risks.
Now nobody can insure against the risk of having a bad heart–you
cannot bet on
the dice after you have rolled them. People with bad hearts can
insure against
the residual uncertainty of when their hearts will fail. People
with good
hearts cannot insure even against that unless they are willing
to do it at a
bad heart price.
The classic
article on the problem
is “The Market for Lemons” by George Akerlof. It described the
same logic in
the context of the used car market. The seller knows if his car
is a lemon or a
creampuff; the buyer doesn’t. Buyers offer the same price for
lemons and
creampuffs, since they cannot tell which is which. At that
price, owners of
creampuffs are much less willing to sell than owners of lemons,
so if the
seller accepts your offer the car is probably a lemon. Knowing
that, you offer
a lemon price. In the limiting case, the result is a market
where only lemons
sell.
The problem is
called adverse
selection. Its origin is assymetric information–one party to an
exchange knows
the value of the good being sold, the other does not.
Rule 4 provides
the best
outcome. People who want to insure against the risk of a bad
heart can buy
insurance before being tested. Since the insurer knows that they
have not been
tested, the price will be based on the cost of insuring a random
customer.
After they are insured they can then decide whether the
advantage of better
information about what health precautions they should take and
how long they
can expect to live outweighs the risk of learning something they
may not want
to know.
But rule 4 may
not be an
option, especially in a world of many countries. Even if the
United States
insists that all tests be recorded and successfully suppresses
any black market
in secret tests, American citizens can still get their genes
tested somewhere
with less restrictive rules. The same problems apply to rule 1.
So it is
possible that the invention of the test, by moving us from the
world of rule 1
to the world of rule 2 or 3, may make the risk of being born
with a bad heart
uninsurable, just as the risk of being born poor is now. If that
effect is
large enough to outweigh the benefits that individuals get from
knowing more
about their own health risks the invention of the test will have
made us worse
off.
I
was introduced
to this problem by a commencement speech proposing rule 3 as a
way of
protecting people from the use of genetic information by their
insurance
companies. I concluded that the speaker had never heard of
adverse selection.
Suppose we
expand our
example by assuming that genetic testing provides good
information not only on the
risk of a heart attack but on the risks of most other causes of
mortality.
Neither the insurance company nor I can predict the date of my
death precisely,
but we can predict it accurately enough to eliminate much of the
benefit of
life insurance in case 2, accurately enough so that adverse
selection destroys
the market for life insurance in case 3. We are now,
economically speaking, in
the world of “Lifeline.”
Finally,
suppose that
Professor Pinero, anticipating the risk that the life insurance
companies will
take measures to shorten his life expectancy, wants to reduce
the damage his invention
does to the life insurance industry. How could he unilaterally
establish rule
3?
Rule 3 reduces
the problem
but does not eliminate it, since his invention still reduces the
demand for
life insurance. What additional precautions might he take to
deter the
insurance companies from having him killed?
I have been
assuming a world
where mortality is largely determined by genetics and we know
enough to use
genetics to predict it. The first assumption is at least
doubtful, the second, at
present, false. But the same issue played an important role in a
major real
world controversy–over the Affordable Care Act, aka Obamacare.
There are at
least two
things about a potential customer for medical insurance that
tell us a good
deal about how much he can be expected to cost the insurance
company. One is
how old he is–young people are much less likely to require
expensive care than
old people. The other is his current medical condition. If you
have survived
one heart attack, the odds that you will have another are high.
In an
unregulated marketplace for health insurance, insurance
companies will take
account of those effects. They will be happy to insure everyone,
but not at the
same price. Young people will be charged much less than old,
healthy people
less than sick.
Under
Obamacare, insurance
companies were forbidden to make the price they charged depend
on the patient’s
state of health–premiums had to be the same for everyone of a
given age,
independent of pre-existing conditions. They were permitted to
charge old
people more than young, but the ratio of prices could not be
more than three to
one. That made insurance a bad deal if you were young, a good
deal if you were
old, a bad deal if you were healthy, a good deal if you already
had expensive
medical problems. Both customer and insurance companies had the
information
that predicted how much the insurance company would have to pay
for the
customer’s medical expenses but the insurance company was
forbidden to use it
in deciding at what price to sell the customer insurance.
If customers
had remained
free to decide whether or not to buy insurance, many for whom it
was a bad deal
at the price, the young and healthy, would have chosen not to.
That would have
raised the average cost to the insurance companies. Since they
had to cover
their costs, the price of insurance would rise. The more it
rises, the more of
the young and healthy choose to go uninsured.
The solution to
that
problem, obvious to the economists involved in designing the
program, was to
forbid the customers as well as the companies from using the
information both
had, to require everyone to buy insurance whether or not he
thought it was a
good deal for him. So the program included a mandate, a
requirement that
everyone buy insurance and a penalty for not doing so. That
ended up as one of its
most controversial elements.
I have
simplified the
details of ACA in my description, but I do not think in ways
that affect its
essential logic.