Problems for Chapter 17

  

I. Briefly answer one of the following questions:

A. Why would one expect a system of norms, such as that in Shasta County, to be efficient in ways that work for small groups but not in ways that work only if everyone does them?

Answer: See page 277

B. What were the incentives for a private party to prosecute a criminal case in 18th century England?

Answer: See pages 267 and 268

C. One problem with private enforcement of law is that low probabilities of deterrence must be balanced by large penalties, which defendants may be unable to pay. What were the ways in which the legal system of saga period Iceland dealt with that problem?

Answer: See page 266

D. One problem with private enforcement of law is that poor or weak victims may not have the resources to prosecute those who commit an offense against them. What were the ways in which the legal system of saga period Iceland dealt with that problem?

Answer: See pages 265 and 266

 


II. Discuss any one of the following questions:

A. How did potential victims of crime in 18th century England make deterrence into a private good?

Answer: See pages 267 and 268

B. How did the privately enforced legal system of saga period Iceland make it possible for a plaintiff to get justice against a more powerful defendant?

Answer: See pages 265 and 266

C. How do residents of Shasta County punish neighbors who repeatedly allow their cattle to stray into their fields and do damage? Why do they use those punishments instead of other and apparently more efficient alternatives?

Answer: See pages 275 and 276